In nature, few species remain dominant for long. Any sizable population of similar individuals offers immense resources to whichever parasite can evade its defenses, spreading rapidly from one member to the next.
Which will prove greater: our defenses or our vulnerabilities?
Humans are one such dominant species. That wasn't always the case: our hunter-gatherer ancestors lived in groups too small and poorly connected to spread pathogens like wildfire. Our collective vulnerability to pandemics began with the dawn of cities and trade networks thousands of years ago. Roman cities were always demographic sinks, but never more so than when a pandemic agent swept through. The plague of Cyprian, the Antonine plague, the plague of Justinian – each is thought to have killed over ten million people, an appallingly high fraction of the total population of the empire.
With the advent of sanitation, hygiene, and quarantines, we developed our first non-immunological defenses to curtail the spread of plagues. With antibiotics, we began to turn the weapons of microbes against our microbial foes. Most potent of all, we use vaccines to train our immune systems to fight pathogens before we are even exposed. Edward Jenner's original vaccine alone is estimated to have saved half a billion lives.
It's been over a century since we suffered from a swift and deadly pandemic. Even the last deadly influenza of 1918 killed only a few percent of humanity – nothing so bad as any of the Roman plagues, let alone the Black Death of medieval times.
How much of our recent winning streak has been due to luck?
Much rides on that question, because the same factors that first made our ancestors vulnerable are now ubiquitous. Our cities are far larger than those of ancient times. They're inhabited by an ever-growing fraction of humanity, and are increasingly closely connected: we now routinely travel around the world in the course of a day. Despite urbanization, global population growth has increased contact with wild animals, creating more opportunities for zoonotic pathogens to jump species. Which will prove greater: our defenses or our vulnerabilities?
The tragic emergence of coronavirus 2019-nCoV in Wuhan may provide a test case. How devastating this virus will become is highly uncertain at the time of writing, but its rapid spread to many countries is deeply worrisome. That it seems to kill only the already infirm and spare the healthy is small comfort, and may counterintuitively assist its spread: it's easy to implement a quarantine when everyone infected becomes extremely ill, but if carriers may not exhibit symptoms as has been reported, it becomes exceedingly difficult to limit transmission. The virus, a distant relative of the more lethal SARS virus that killed 800 people in 2002 to 2003, has evolved to be transmitted between humans and spread to 18 countries in just six weeks.
Humanity's response has been faster than ever, if not fast enough. To its immense credit, China swiftly shared information, organized and built new treatment centers, closed schools, and established quarantines. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, which was founded in 2017, quickly funded three different companies to develop three different varieties of vaccine: a standard protein vaccine, a DNA vaccine, and an RNA vaccine, with more planned. One of the agreements was signed after just four days of discussion, far faster than has ever been done before.
The new vaccine candidates will likely be ready for clinical trials by early summer, but even if successful, it will be additional months before the vaccine will be widely available. The delay may well be shorter than ever before thanks to advances in manufacturing and logistics, but a delay it will be.
The 1918 influenza virus killed more than half of its victims in the United Kingdom over just three months.
If we faced a truly nasty virus, something that spreads like pandemic influenza – let alone measles – yet with the higher fatality rate of, say, H7N9 avian influenza, the situation would be grim. We are profoundly unprepared, on many different levels.
So what would it take to provide us with a robust defense against pandemics?
Minimize the attack surface: 2019-nCoV jumped from an animal, most probably a bat, to humans. China has now banned the wildlife trade in response to the epidemic. Keeping it banned would be prudent, but won't be possible in all nations. Still, there are other methods of protection. Influenza viruses commonly jump from birds to pigs to humans; the new coronavirus may have similarly passed through a livestock animal. Thanks to CRISPR, we can now edit the genomes of most livestock. If we made them immune to known viruses, and introduced those engineered traits to domesticated animals everywhere, we would create a firewall in those intermediate hosts. We might even consider heritably immunizing the wild organisms most likely to serve as reservoirs of disease.
None of these defenses will be cheap, but they'll be worth every penny.
Rapid diagnostics: We need a reliable method of detection costing just pennies to be available worldwide inside of a week of discovering a new virus. This may eventually be possible thanks to a technology called SHERLOCK, which is based on a CRISPR system more commonly used for precision genome editing. Instead of using CRISPR to find and edit a particular genome sequence in a cell, SHERLOCK programs it to search for a desired target and initiate an easily detected chain reaction upon discovery. The technology is capable of fantastic sensitivity: with an attomolar (10-18) detection limit, it senses single molecules of a unique DNA or RNA fingerprint, and the components can be freeze-dried onto paper strips.
Better preparations: China acted swiftly to curtail the spread of the Wuhan virus with traditional public health measures, but not everything went as smoothly as it might have. Most cities and nations have never conducted a pandemic preparedness drill. Best give people a chance to practice keeping the city barely functional while minimizing potential exposure events before facing the real thing.
Faster vaccines: Three months to clinical trials is too long. We need a robust vaccine discovery and production system that can generate six candidates within a week of the pathogen's identification, manufacture a million doses the week after, and scale up to a hundred million inside of a month. That may be possible for novel DNA and RNA-based vaccines, and indeed anything that can be delivered using a standardized gene therapy vector. For example, instead of teaching each person's immune system to evolve protective antibodies by showing it pieces of the virus, we can program cells to directly produce known antibodies via gene therapy. Those antibodies could be discovered by sifting existing diverse libraries of hundreds of millions of candidates, computationally designed from scratch, evolved using synthetic laboratory ecosystems, or even harvested from the first patients to report symptoms. Such a vaccine might be discovered and produced fast enough at scale to halt almost any natural pandemic.
Robust production and delivery: Our defenses must not be vulnerable to the social and economic disruptions caused by a pandemic. Unfortunately, our economy selects for speed and efficiency at the expense of robustness. Just-in-time supply chains that wing their way around the world require every node to be intact. If workers aren't on the job producing a critical component, the whole chain breaks until a substitute can be found. A truly nasty pandemic would disrupt economies all over the world, so we will need to pay extra to preserve the capacity for independent vertically integrated production chains in multiple nations. Similarly, vaccines are only useful if people receive them, so delivery systems should be as robustly automated as possible.
None of these defenses will be cheap, but they'll be worth every penny. Our nations collectively spend trillions on defense against one another, but only billions to protect humanity from pandemic viruses known to have killed more people than any human weapon. That's foolish – especially since natural animal diseases that jump the species barrier aren't the only pandemic threats.
We will eventually make our society immune to naturally occurring pandemics, but that day has not yet come, and future pandemic viruses may not be natural.
The complete genomes of all historical pandemic viruses ever to have been sequenced are freely available to anyone with an internet connection. True, these are all agents we've faced before, so we have a pre-existing armory of pharmaceuticals and vaccines and experience. There's no guarantee that they would become pandemics again; for example, a large fraction of humanity is almost certainly immune to the 1918 influenza virus due to exposure to the related 2009 pandemic, making it highly unlikely that the virus would take off if released.
Still, making the blueprints publicly available means that a large and growing number of people with the relevant technical skills can single-handedly make deadly biological agents that might be able to spread autonomously -- at least if they can get their hands on the relevant DNA. At present, such people most certainly can, so long as they bother to check the publicly available list of which gene synthesis companies do the right thing and screen orders -- and by implication, which ones don't.
One would hope that at least some of the companies that don't advertise that they screen are "honeypots" paid by intelligence agencies to catch would-be bioterrorists, but even if most of them are, it's still foolish to let individuals access that kind of destructive power. We will eventually make our society immune to naturally occurring pandemics, but that day has not yet come, and future pandemic viruses may not be natural. Hence, we should build a secure and adaptive system capable of screening all DNA synthesis for known and potential future pandemic agents... without disclosing what we think is a credible bioweapon.
Whether or not it becomes a global pandemic, the emergence of Wuhan coronavirus has underscored the need for coordinated action to prevent the spread of pandemic disease. Let's ensure that our reactive response minimally prepares us for future threats, for one day, reacting may not be enough.
Combining CRISPR genome editing with the natural phenomenon of gene drive allows us to rewrite the genomes of wild organisms. The benefits of saving children from malaria by editing mosquitoes are obvious and much discussed, but humans aren't the only creatures who suffer. If we gain the power to intervene in a natural world "red in tooth and claw," yet decline to use it, are we morally responsible for the animal suffering that we could have prevented?
Given the power to alter the workings of the natural world, are we morally obligated to use it?
The scenario that may redefine our relationship with the natural world begins with fine clothing. You're dressed to the nines for a formal event, but you arrived early, and it's such a beautiful day that you decided to take a stroll by the nearby lake. Suddenly, you hear the sound of splashing and screams. A child is drowning! Will you dive in to save them? Or let them die, and preserve your expensive outfit?
The philosopher Peter Singer posited this scenario to show that we are all terrible human beings. Just about everyone would save the child and ruin the outfit... leading Singer to question why so few of us give equivalent amounts of money to save children on the other side of the world. The Against Malaria Foundation averages one life saved for every $7000.
But despite having a local bias, our moral compasses aren't completely broken. You never even considered letting the child drown because the situation wasn't your fault. That's because the cause of the problem simply isn't relevant: as the one who could intervene, the consequences are on your head. We are morally responsible for intervening in situations we did not create.
There is a critical difference between Singer's original scenario and the one above: in his version, it was a muddy pond. Any adult can rescue a child from a muddy pond, but a lake is different; you can only save the child if you know how to swim. We only become morally responsible when we acquire the power to intervene.
Few would disagree with either of these moral statements, but when they are combined with increasingly powerful technologies, the implications are deeply unsettling. Given the power to alter the workings of the natural world, are we morally obligated to use it? Recent developments suggest we had best determine the answer soon because, technologically, we are learning to swim. What choices will we make?
Gene drive is a natural phenomenon that occurs when a genetic element reliably spreads through a population even though it reduces the reproductive fitness of individual organisms. Nature has evolved many different mechanisms that result in gene drive, so many that it's nearly impossible to find an organism that doesn't have at least one driving element somewhere in its genome. More than half of our own DNA comprises the broken remnants of gene drives, plus a few active copies.
Scientists have long dreamed of harnessing gene drive to block mosquito-borne disease, with little success. Then came CRISPR genome editing, which works by cutting target genes and replacing them with a new sequence. What happens if you replace the original sequence with the edited version and an encoded copy of the CRISPR system? Gene drive.
CRISPR is a molecular scalpel that we can use to cut, and therefore replace, just about any DNA sequence in any cell. Encode the instructions for the CRISPR system adjacent to the new sequence, and genome editing will occur in the reproductive cells of subsequent generations of heterozygotes, always converting the original wild-type version to the new edited version. By ensuring that offspring will all be born of one sex, or by arranging for organisms that inherit two copies of the gene drive to be sterile, it's theoretically possible to cause a population crash.
When my colleagues and I first described this technology in 2014, we initially focused on the imperative for early transparency. Gene drive research is more like civic governance than traditional technology development: you can decline a treatment recommended by your doctor, but you canâ€™t opt out when people change the shared environment. Applying the traditional closeted model of science to gene drive actively denies people a voice in decisions intended to affect them - and reforming scientific incentives for gene drive could be the first step to making all of science faster and safer.
But open gene drive research is clearly aligned with virtually all of our values. It's when technology places our deepest moral beliefs in conflict that we struggle, and learn who we truly are.
Two of our strongest moral beliefs include our reverence for the natural world and our abhorrence of suffering. Yet some natural species inherently cause tremendous suffering. Are we morally obligated to alter or even eradicate them?
To anyone who doubts that the natural world can inflict unimaginable suffering, consider the New World screwworm.
Judging by history, the answer depends on who is doing the suffering. We view the eradication of smallpox as one of our greatest triumphs, clearly demonstrating that we value human lives over the existence of disease-causing microorganisms. The same principle holds today for malaria: few would argue against using gene drive to crash populations of malarial mosquitoes to help eradicate the disease. There are more than 3500 species of mosquitoes, only three of which would be affected, and once malaria is gone, the mosquitoes could be allowed to recover. It would be extremely surprising if African nations decided not to eradicate malaria.
The more interesting question concerns our moral obligations to animals in the state of nature.
To anyone who doubts that the natural world can inflict unimaginable suffering, consider the New World screwworm, Cochyliomyia hominivorax. Female screwworm flies lay their eggs in open wounds, generating maggots that devour healthy tissue, gluttonously burrowing into the flesh of their host until they drop, engorged and sated, to metamorphose. Yet before they fall, the maggots in a wound emit a pheromone attracting new females, thereby acting as both conductors and performers in a macabre parade that consumes the host alive. The pain is utterly excruciating, so much so that infested people often require morphine before doctors can even examine the wound. Worst of all, the New World screwworm specializes in devouring complex mammals.
Every second of every day, hundreds of millions of animals suffer the excruciating agony of being eaten alive. It has been so throughout North and South America for millions of years. Until 2001, when humanity eradicated the last screwworm fly north of Panama using the â€œsterile insect techniqueâ€. This was not done to protect wild animals or even people, but for economic reasons: the cost of the program was small relative to the immense damage wrought by the screwworm on North American cattle, sheep, and goats. There were no obvious ecological effects. Despite being almost completely unknown even among animal rights activists, the screwworm elimination campaign may well have been one of the greatest triumphs of animal well-being.
Unfortunately, sterile insect technique isn't powerful enough to eradicate the screwworm from South America, where it is more entrenched and protected by the rougher terrain. But gene drive is.
Contrary to news hype, gene drive alone can't cause extinction, but if combined with conventional measures it might be possible to remove targeted species from the wild. For certain species that cause immense suffering, we may be morally obligated to do just that.
South Americans may well decide to eradicate screwworm for the same economic reasons that it was eradicated from North America: the fly inflicts $4 billion in annual damages on struggling rural communities that can least afford it. It need not go extinct, of course; the existence of the sterile insect facility in Panama proves that we can maintain the screwworm indefinitely in captivity on already dead meat.
Yet if for some reason humanity chooses to leave the screwworm as it is - even for upstanding moral reasons, whatever those may be - the knowledge of our responsibility should haunt us.
Are God and Nature then at strife,
That Nature lends such evil dreams?
So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life.
Evolution by natural selection cares nothing for the single life, nor suffering, nor euphoria, save for their utility in replication. Theoretically, we do. But how much?
[Editor's Note: This story was originally published in May 2018. We are resurfacing archive hits while our staff is on vacation.]